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Costa Rica's Struggle for Neutrality
MAUREEN DUNN

''T

he Contra Killed My Daddy,'' read the headlines in one Costa
Rican newspaper in mid 1983. Six
"campesinos" in the border town of
Upala are murdered by Pastora's
ARDE men. Upala is attacked. Warlordism on the border increases. FESIAN (La Federacion Sindical Agraria
Nacional), a peasant group, charges
that private armies are attacking settlements of ''precaristas,'' legal squatters, on a U.S. citizen-owned ranch.
Once unheard of, these kinds of violent
and often politically related crimes are
becoming more common in Costa
Rica. Though not to be compared with
the death squads of El Salvador and
Guatemala, or even of the police
abuses of Honduras, Costa Rica's nonmilitaristic, tranquil posture is being
threatened by increased militarization
of its police forces, violence by
deserted contras, warlordism of North
American ranchers, and the potential
of defeated contras and frustrated
ranchers turning their guns and antagonism against supposed "subversives"
in their own neighborhoods.
The Costa Rican Commission of
Human Rights (CODEHU) reported
for 1985, owing mainly to the impunity
with which the contras move about in
the northern border area, violent evictions in the northern zones by the
Costa Rican Rural Guard of more than
two hundred squatter families. Many
of these were detained, including
women and minors, put in cells with

drunks and common criminals and
threatened with beatings. Later, the
Commission confirmed cases of constant harrassment by the "guardia"
who were seen accompanied by armed,
paid guards of the area's large ranchers. Detentions and confiscation of
documents at airports and immigration
posts at the borders have been reported
by human rights groups, religious
organizations, the Womens' Alliance
of Costa Rica, the Christian Movement
for Peace, the Evangelical Church, a
member of the Institute of Social and
Economic Analysis of Brazil, many
youth members of the Vanguard party,
the small, legal communist party of
Costa Rica and even youth members of
the National Liberation Party, the present ruling party.
A Costa Rican who works in development with women's groups, told me
that the disappearances, robberies and
murders are more numerous than
believed. The Costa Rican Guard is
unable to check all cases and many go
unreported for fear of reprisal. Many
families simply abandon their plots
and move farther south, thus adding to
the number of displaced that are found
in Costa Rican cities. In an interview
with Steve Rubin of The Village Voice,
Ronaldo Campos, a peasant organizer
with the Popular Vanguard party, explains what happens when campesinos,
hearing so much about Sandinistas invading, see fighting or other activity
near the border towns where they live.
"They go to report the invasion.
Sometimes there is an investigation.
They find the encampment and ARDE
[Nicaraguan Eden Pastora's counter-

revolutionary group that operates on
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border] has
to go back into Nicaragua. Or there is
no investigation and someone tells
ARDE who made the report. In both
cases there is a visit to the campesino.
Maybe he changes his story . . . maybe
he remembers everything ....
" But
in any case, he points out, it goes badly
for the peasant, and he imitates a
shooting through the throat (The
Village Voice, December 24, 1985).
Captured weapons caches, revelations by arrested and jailed U.S.
operatives working with the contras, a
bombing during a press conference
with Pastora that left one U.S. journalist dead and others wounded, U.S.
ranchers' overt ties to the CIA and
contra financing, and charges of drug
trafficking by contra leaders working
out of Costa Rica set the stage for a
drama that rivals any espionage novel.
Costa Rican neutrality is being put to
the test-it is ''being subtly deprived of
its own traditions," laments Peter
Duisberg, a U.S. scientist living in
Costa Rica (The Tico Times, September 20, 1985).
Yet, Costa Ricans stand firm in their
belief and commitment to military
neutrality and have admirably attempted to avoid becoming embroiled in the
East-West power struggle that tugs at
their Central American neighbors. On
February 2, 1986, Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez of the National Liberation Party,
the candidate who favored preserving
this small democracy's rare legacy of
miliary neutrality, won the presidency
by 52 percent of the vote. The Presi-

Continued on page Two
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Continued from page One
dent-elect has not been reluctant to
speak out against U.S. aid to the contras and against contra use of Costa
Rican soil to launch attacks in bordering Nicaragua:
'' If I were Mr. Reagan, I would give
that money to Guatemala,
El
Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica
for economic aid and not military aid
to the contras ... the result with the
aid to the contras has been a more
dictatorial, more totalitarian government in the north [Nicaragua]" (The
Tico Times, February 21, 1986).

Pressing Costa Rica for over five
years now to align itself more openly
with U.S. military policy in the region
in hopes of securing full military
cooperation from all states bordering
Nicaragua, the Reagan administration,
concerned by Arias' challenge to U.S.
policy, has stepped up pressure on the
newly-elected leader. A Costa Rican
government source reported that U.S.
officials informed Monge of the
Reagan administration's
displeasure
with Arias (Washington Post, April 13,
1986) and shortly after Dr. Arias made
his remarks, U.S. Undersecretary of
Defense, William Taft went to Costa
Rica to meet with President-elect
and President Monge. After the House
defeated the contra aid measure on
March 20, 1986, Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, accompanied by
General John Galvin, head of the
Southern Command met with Monge
in San Jose. Costa Rican officials, including Eduardo Lisano, Executive
President of the Central Bank, feel that
the Administration is delaying U.S. aid
to put pressure on Arias. They cite the
fact that no payments of fiscal 1986
funds have been made to Costa Rica
yet (Washington Post, April 13, 1986).
Costa Ricans have referred proudly
to their nation as a geopolitical accident. They boast of having a system of
socialized medicine,
limited land
reform, ninety-percent literacy, a thriving middle-class, the oldest continuous
parliamentary democracy in Central
America and of unarmed democracy.
Founded by dissenters from Spain who
wanted to be far from the Spanish
Captain Generals in Guatemala, Costa
Rica was a poor country where Spanish
settlers and Governors alike had to
work their own land to survive. There
was no aristocracy and as a result, a
kind of agrarian democracy developed
(though some began to prosper more
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than others with the advent of large
scale coffee cultivation). Nevertheless,
Costa Rica continued to be poor; most
of the population lived below subsistence level. Those better off dismissed
the poverty,
reminding
themselves that Costa Ricans still lived
better than their neighbors.
During the 1940's, two prominent
political figures emerged who dramatically influenced the future of Costa
Rican society: Rafael Angel Calderon
Guardia, a medical doctor of great personal popularity; Jose Figueres Ferrer,
a well-to-do self-made agriculturist.
Guardia, elected President by an overwhelming majority in 1940, tried to
negate the criticisms of the Communists,
represented
by Mora
Valverde's Block of Workers and
Peasants,
and to persuade
the
wealthier class of the necessity for
reforms. He proposed tax revision,
rural credit and land distribution,
development of the Atlantic region
(then abandoned by the colonial empire of United Fruit), a low-cost housing program, founding of a national
university and a social security system.
However, World War II had a profound effect on implementing Guardia's programs. Trade with Western
Europe was disrupted and Costa Rica
was pressured by the U.S. to export to
the Panama Canal Zone. Shortages for
capital goods and manufactured articles brought about inflation which
was further aggravated by the heavy
cost of building the Pan American
Highway.
As an ally of the Soviet Union in the
fight against Fascism, the U.S. encouraged national communist parties
to collaborate with their democratic
governments. For Guardia, this meant
an alliance with Mora's communist
party and an acceleration of his proposed reforms. But Guardia became
gradually criticized for electoral fraud
in subsequent elections and for his
communist associations. The Opposition, influenced at this time by the U.S.
cold war, boycotted sessions in Congress and intensified its propaganda
against the communists. Meanwhile, in
1944, Jose Figueres, exiled in Mexico
for his outspoken opposition to the
presidency, returned to Costa Rica and
with his flamboyant speaking tours
and strong international connections
was able to gain wide support.
In 1948, when Otilio Ulate, a
moderate conservative aligned with
Resist Newsletter

Figueres, was elected by 54 percent of
the vote, Guardia supporters in the national assembly annulled the elections
and arrested Ulate. In the end,
Figueres was successful in launching a
military takeover of the government
and establishing a provisional junta
which within 18 months had nationalized the banks, imposed a ten percent
tax on private capital and established a
state owned electric power institute. It
became
surprisingly
clear that
Figueres' Social Democrats were more
socialist than the regime they replaced.
In a formal ceremony in December
1948, the Junta's Minister of War and
Public Security proclaimed the abolition of the army and handed over the
keys of the army barracks to the
Minister for Education. In reflecting
on this historical event, Rodrigo
Carazo Odio, President of the Peace
University and former President of
Costa Rica, reminds us that "it is important to remember that this was not
a defeated army, but a victorious one.
Today, people such as myself have
become fully convinced that a country
that organizes an army becomes its
own jailer ....
'' (Andrew Reding, in
World Policy Journal, Spring 1986, p.
331).
Until very recently, Costa Rica's
security has relied on the InterAmerican defense system and a modest
uniformed force of 15,000 rural and
Continued on page Six
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The Nicaraguan Constitutional
Process
GEORGE VICKERS
Except
for the metal detector
through which participants had to
pass, there was nothing outwardly
unusual about the gathering of legal
scholars and academics from around
the United States at New York University Law School the weekend of April
18-20. The two-hundredth anniversary
of the United States Constitution will
be celebrated in 1987, so it was not surprising to find a large national conference discussing the mechanics of
drafting a constitution.
What was going on inside the hall
was anything but ordinary, however.
For the constitutional process being examined was the one currently underway to produce a new Nicaraguan cons titu ti on. The NYU conference
brought together North American
scholars and a special joint delegation
of the Nicaraguan National Assembly
and the Nicaraguan Supreme Court.
The Nicaraguans had requested the
meeting to get comments on the recently completed first draft of the new
Nicaraguan constitution from scholars
familiar with the U.S. constitutional
experience. The Nicaraguan delegation
included not only Sandinista representatives, but also key leaders of
Nicaraguan political parties that are
pro-capitalist and anti-Sandinista in
orientation.
Despite efforts by organizers to
publicize the meeting (sponsors included Rutgers University, The City University of New York, the Society of
American Law Teachers, and the Latin
American Studies Association), there
was a media blackout of the conference. What little coverage did appear
(the New York Times ran a story a
week after the conference ended) focused on opposition criticisms of the
Sandinistas rather than on describing
the constitutional process underway in
Nicaragua. In the face of Reagan Administration warnings that the Sandinistas were carrying out a ''disinformation campaign" to deceive U.S. public
opinion, it is not surprising that the
media chose to ignore the NYU con#186

Nicaraguanvoters

ference. Any coverage of the actual State and in society, the Nicaraguan
proceedings would have made it obvi- constitution guarantees the right to
ous that Administration descriptions organize political parties "with the obof Nicaragua as a Communist, totali- ject, among others, of aspiring to obtarian State are contradicted both by tain political power.'' Where the
the substance of the constitutional Cuban constitution
speaks of a
framework under discussion and the socialist economy as its goal, the
process through which a new constitu- Nicaraguan draft constitution permits
tional order is emerging.
a mixture of state owned, private, and
On the contrary, the draft Nicara- cooperative ownership, and authorizes
guan constitution is a quite unique ''the establishment of reasonable prodocument that seeks to merge the em- fit margins." Where the Cuban conphasis on political pluralism, separa- stitution declares that Cuba is part of
tion of powers, and individual rights the "world socialist community," the
found in many "Western democra- Nicaraguan draft expresses opposition
cies,'' with the emphasis on social and to "the existence of military blocks and
economic justice found in many alliances. ''
Unlike the constitutions of Cuba and
Socialist countries. In doing so, it projects a governmental and political the USSR, which emphasize the ''unity
structure very different from that of of powers," the draft Nicaraguan conregimes governed by Communist par- stitution resembles that of the United
ties.
States with its emphasis on a separation of powers. While substantially
Key Elements of the Draft
weaker than the U.S. constitution in
Constitution
terms of "checks and balances," the
The difference
between
the draft does provide for Executive veto
Nicaraguan constitutional framework of legislation, legislative override of
and that of typical Communist coun- such veto by 60% of the Assembly, and
tries is evident in the preamble to the judicial review of executive and legiconstitution, which sets forth certain slative decision.
"fundamental principles," including a
In many respects the draft constitucommitment to political pluralism, a tion goes beyond the U.S. Constitution
in iterating human rights guarantees.
mixed economy, and non-alignment.
Where the Cuban constitution (to take In the key section on "Rights, Duties
one example of a ''Communist con- and Guarantees of the Nicaraguan
stitution") recognizes only the Com- People,'' the document spells out in
munist Party and institutionalizes the considerable detail not only the rights
Party as the highest force both in the
Continued on page Four
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Nicaragua
Continued from page Three
we associate with our Bill of Rights,
but many additional rights that do not
enjoy constitutional protection in the
United States. Among the individual
and civil rights guaranteed under the
draft are: the right to life (no death
penalty); personal liberty (no arbitrary
detention or imprisonment); equality
before the law; freedom of expression,
movement, conscience and religion;
and criminal procedure guarantees
(presumption of innocence, habeas
corpus, speedy trial, avoidance of selfincrimination and double jeopardy,
right to counsel, etc.). This draft also
guarantees ''political rights'' including
assembly, political organizing, petition
of grievances, etc.
While most North Americans would
recognize these individual and political
rights as similar to those in the U.S.
Constitution, the draft also defines
fundamental social and economic
rights that have equal status. Among
these are the ''right to nourishment,''
''right to health,'' ''right to housing,''
"right to work," and "right to strike."
In all these areas the constitution requires the State to observe and guarantee these rights. Article 111
specifically requires that ''the State
shall set forth the necessary corrective
measures in order to achieve an equitable distribution of wealth and income
among all citizens."

Unresolved Issues
Although the general framework of
constitutional democracy described in
the draft constitution seems to enjoy
support from all the parties represented in the Nicaraguan National
Assembly, there are some key issues
that must be resolved before it will be
clear whether the constitution finally
adopted will be perceived within Nicaragua as a national, rather than a Sandinista, document.
The most fundamental unresolved
issue in the draft is a tension between
''participatory'' and ''representative''
forms of democracy. The draft defines
the form of government as, "a democratic, participatory, representative
and non-aligned Republic." Specific
articles reflecting the concept of participatory democracy require the State
to see that mass organizations
representing agricultural and other
workers have a role in the planning,
oversight, and control of measures that
effect them. Other articles authorize
popular militias and require ''popular
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participation'' in the organization and
administration of justice.
Alongside these references to participatory mechanisms, the draft constitution
elaborates
a relatively
straightforward
''representative''
structure
of government,
with
legislative, executive, judicial, and
electoral branches. The draft leaves
unclear the relationship between these
representative organs and the participatory mechanisms ref erred to
elsewhere.
All of the opposition parties believe
(probably correctly) that popular participation by · mass organizations in
State activities will strengthen Sandinista control because of FSLN influence in the mass organizations. As a
result, they want the form of government to follow more closely traditional
representative democratic institutions,
and to clearly limit popular participation to a consultative role.
From the comments of both Sandinista and opposition representatives
at the NYU conference, it seems clear
that the FSLN has not, as a party,
made a final decision on the balance
between participatory and representative forms. While they believe it is
essential to provide a role for mass
organizations in order to maintain support and enthusiasm for the revolutionary process, they also desire as
broad a base of political support as
possible for the constitutional structure
that emerges. To the extent that continued support for the constitutional
process by opposition parties requires
compromises on ''popular participation,'' some fundamental decisions
have yet to be taken by the FSLN
leadership.
Another
area of unresolved
disagreements involves the separation
of powers and system of checks and
balances set forth in the draft.
Although the draft constitution
establishes a separation of powers between legislative, executive, judicial,
and electoral branches, the powers of
the executive are far greater than those
of the executive under the U.S. Constitution. The President of Nicaragua,
under the draft, has the power to propose and approve the national budget,
to unilaterally declare war, and to
declare a State of Emergency under
which major portions of the Constitution can be suspended. The National
Assembly has the power to review the
budget, to "solicit reports and ex-
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amine" Ministers (but not to censure
them), and to ratify or modify the
State of Emergency within ninety days
(except in time of war, when no
ratification is necessary). The President appoints the Mayor of Managua,
and (as in the U.S.) nominates
Supreme Court justices for approval
by the National Assembly. The term of
office for judges is, however, coterminous with that of the National
Assembly.
The emphasis on a strong executive
branch in part reflects the tendency of
all Latin democracies to favor a strong
executive, but it also reflects a belief on
the part of many Nicaraguan leaders
that the overthrow of Salvador Allende
in Chile demonstrated how formal
mechanisms like separation of powers
can be used to undermine the very
framework of democracy. During the
Allende period the Chilean Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional more
than thirty-five laws passed by Congress and approved by the President.
The concern that constitutional
separation of powers should not undermine the popular will is not limited to
the Sandinistas. The leader of the Conservative Democratic Party, responding to some North American criticisms
of executive power in the draft, said at
the conference that "any President
who is elected should be able to carry
out the program of his campaign." At
the same time, opposition members
favor some strengthening of the
powers of the National Assembly. It
seems likely that the final draft will, at
the very least, expand the powers of the
National Assembly and limit the power
of the President to unilaterally declare
war.
The chief concern of the opposition
parties, as reflected in their concern
about "participatory democracy," is
that at present there is not a clear line
of demarcation between State organs
and the FSLN. Given the present
dominance of the FSLN, they want the
constitution to clearly state that
government officials, public servants,
and the armed forces must be nonpartisan, and that party identifications
must be removed from public offices
or activities. For the same reason, they
resist any formulation that would give
Sandinista controlled mass organizations a formal role in government
decision-making or administration.
Continued on next page
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The NicaraguanConstitutionalProcess
The draft now under discussion is
very much a first draft, and the
unresolved issues described above
make it clear that some significant
changes are likely before the final
adoption of a new constitution next
January. The first draft reviewed at the
NYU conference is the outgrowth of a
formal constitution process that has
been underway for almost a year, but
there are several steps scheduled before
a final draft will be adopted. Indeed,
there is some uncertainty about how
the final decision will be made.
The drafting of the constitution is
the responsibility and principal function of the 96 member National
Assembly elected in November, 1984.
Last May, the Assembly approved a
structure and process for the drafting.
It formed a Special Constitutional
Commission to oversee the entire constitutional process. The commission
has twenty-two assembly members
representing all seven political parties.
Twelve of the commission members are
from the FSLN, while ten are from oppo sit ion parties
including
the
Democratic Party (PCD), Liberal Independent Party (PLI), Popular Social
Christian Party (PPSC), Nicaraguan
Socialist Party (PSN), Communist
Party of Nicaragua (PC de N), and
Marxist-Leninist
Popular
Action
Movement (MAP-ML).
Three sub-commissions were formed
to assist the Special Constitutional
Commission. The Sub-Committee on
the Exterior was created to examine
constitutions of other countries as
possible models. That sub-commission
organized delegations last Fall that
visited other Latin American countries,
Western European nations including
France, Germany, and England, and
several Eastern European countries.
The NYU meeting was another in these
consultations to consider the Nicaraguan constitution in the light of other
constitutional experiments.
The Sub-Commission on National
Consultation was created to organize
two rounds of national dialogue on the
constitution. The first round included
formal presentations last August and
September by political parties (including two that boycotted the
assembly elections) on ideas for what
the constitution should contain. After
these presentations, more informal
meetings were held with representatives
of unions, professional organizations,
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and other popular and mass organizations throughout the Fall. A second
round of national debate is scheduled
for next month to get responses to the
first draft of the constitution.
A third sub-commission, the SubCommission on Constitutional Affairs, was created to take the input
from the other sub-commissions and
prepare the actual draft for consideration. This sub-commission also received input from the Supreme Court.
On February 21, 1986, the Special
Constitutional Commission formally
submitted a first draft of the new constitution to the National Assembly.
While not all members of the commission agree with every article as now
written, they did agree that sufficient
agreement on an overall framework
had been reached to allow the process
to move to the next round of national
debate.
After the next round of national
dialogue, a new draft will be prepared
and submitted to the National Assembly for approval. That final approval
process should begin in September or
October, and is expected to last until
January 7, 1987. Under the present
rules, Articles will be voted on individually, and final approval of the
constitution will require a 60% vote in
favor by the National Assembly. Opposition parties have called for an
alternative approval process, however,
involving a national referendum on the
final draft approved by the Assembly.
To most of the North American participants in the NYU conference there
was a certain sense of unreality in
discussing with Nicaraguan representatives their draft constitution while, in
Washington, the U.S. Congress was
debating when and how much military
aid to provide towards the overthrow
of the Nicaraguan government. In the
end, decisions made in Washington
will certainly have far more influence
on the political character of Nicaraguan society than any advice from
North American academics.
Haywood Burns, Director of the
CUNY Center for Legal Education,
compared the NYU conference to sitting down with the Founding Fathers
to discuss how much power to give the
federal government. While that may be
a bit dramatic, there is certainly a
degree of irony in the fact that the fate
of the Nicaraguan constitutional process may be strongly influenced by the
degree to which the checks and bal-
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ances provided in our own two hundred year old constitution still have any
life.

George Vickers is a member of the
Resist board.

SPANISH
LANGUAGE
TAPES FOR WOMEN

SHOUTING
TRUTH

ANOTHER

We are pleased to announce a
women's introductory language course
on cassette tape, "Gritando Otra Verdad: Shouting Another Truth." This
course is especially designed for US
women who share their Central American sisters' yearning for peace and willingness to struggle for freedom.
Available in January 1986, the eight
lessons also include song and poetry by
Latin American women. Lessons are
read by native speakers. The two Spanish cassette tapes and the 75-page
Study Booklet contain relevant dialogues, vocabulary, oral exercises of
increasing difficulty and informative
sketches about women's groups in the
region.
The cost of this unique resource is
$20. It can be ordered from the Center
for Educational Design and Communication, 821 Varnum Street N.E.,
Washington, DC 20017. Payment
(check or money order) must accompany order. Please make check payable
to: Center for Educational Design.

I

The Resist Pledge System
The most important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!

l

Yes, I would like to pledgeS
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name ___________

_

Address __________

_

City___

_

State__ Zip___
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Costa Rica
Continued from page Two

civil guards who do everything from
search and rescue to traffic control.
With each presidential election, the
guards retire and the ranks are filled by
the party in power just like any other
political position. This arrangement is
gradually being changed as Costa Rica
moves dangerously close to establishing a permanent military force. Last
May, the Minister of Public Security,
Benjamin Piza, asked the U.S., without first informing President Monge,
to train 700 Costa Rican civil guardsmen into a rapid reaction force. On a
ranch only miles from the Nicaraguan
border and on Costa Rica's deepest
natural water port (allowing rapid access to Nicaragua's Pacific Coast), 22
U.S. Green Berets instruct the guardsmen in tactical communications, the
use of M-16 automatic rifles, M60
machine guns, 50-caliber machine
guns, 81mm mortars and 90mm
recoiless rifles. Costa Rican officials
repeatedly deny forming a permanent
military force, thus violating neutrality. Yet, during the presidential campaigns last year, both candidates
pledged to retain the U.S. trained
''Lightning Brigade'' and not subject it
to the patronage system.
Public Security Minister Benjamin
Piza asserts that the special force is
necessary to respond to the potential
threat of left-wing guerrillas trained in
Nicaragua. (And indeed, in early May
1985, U.S. State Department spokesman, Edward Djerejian, announced in
Washington that 200 Costa Rican
''leftists'' had gone to Nicaragua to
fight alongside the Sandinistas. When
Costa Rica's Security Council asked
the U.S. Embassy for proof, the State
Department could not substantiate it).
(The New York Times, May 19, 1985).
Critics of U.S. training, however,
believe the U.S. was behind Costa
Rica, pushing for the "ok" to bring in
advisers in order to get a secure
foothold in the country. Former Public
Security Minister, Juan Jose Echeverria, warns of another possible scenario
as a consequence of military training:
Due to the deteriorating economic
situation in the country, the conservative sectors of Costa Rica ''will need
a strong police force for repression"
(Philadelphia Inquirer, August 12,
1985). And political analysts predict
that if the "guardia" are trained and
armed to the degree of El Salvadoran
and Guatemalan armies, they will
become more repressive and as a result,
Page Six
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Costa Rican guardsmen in training
border, May 1985.

opposition groups will inevitably take
up arms.
Long before the U.S. military advisers were invited, Costa Rica's
neutrality was under attack. In 1981,
former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne
Kirkpatrick admonished Costa Rican
officials; if they did not raise an army,
they might well forfeit U.S. economic
assistance. Outraged by such overt interference, President Carazo demanded two letters of apology.
That same year security assistance to
Costa Rica was renewed after a thirteen year lapse. Before Monge took office in 1982, he was approached by the
CIA to set up secret camps to train
Nicaraguan exiles-on a short term
basis, he was assured, since the contras
were sure to win within six months.
When the U.S. army offered to have
1,000 U.S. National Guardsmen build
a network of roads along the border
with Nicaragua, Costa Ricans protested and President Monge again said
absolutely not. At the same time that
President Reagan visited Costa Rica in
December 1982, the Minister of Public
Security announced the formation of a
reserve paramilitary force of 10,000
civilians (Organizacion para Emergencia Nacional) trained in use of light
weapons and emergency tactics, such
as crowd control. Since 1983, 500 civil
guards have been trained by the U.S. in
Panama and in Fort Benning, Georgia
(The Financial Times, February 28,
1985) and U.S. battleships have frequented Costa Rican ports, making
"goodwill" visits-most recently, this
past February. Despite Monge's
Resist Newsletter
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previous denials of U.S. offers for
road building assistance, this past
February, 182 U.S. army engineers
came to Costa Rica to build bridges
and improve the Costa Nera Sur road
on the Pacific Coast. Opposed by
Costa Rican peace groups and the
Costa Rican engineering association
(who demanded the engineers meet the
same criteria for employment as Costa
Rican engineers), the improvement
project will cut travel time from Costa
Rica's southern border to the northern
one by one-third.
While disapproving of U.S. aid to
the contras and the trade embargo
against Nicaragua, former President
Monge quietly acquiesced to a growing
U.S. influence: $1.2 million per day in
U.S. aid; a nearly $7 million jump in
U.S. military aid from 1983 to 1985; an
increase of U.S. embassy staff from 35
in 1983 to 150 at present. A recently
approved U.S. counter-terrorism program, which abolishes prohibitions on
police training in Latin America (instituted in 1974 when the Congress
learned that U.S. trained security
forces were involved in torture and
massacres against their own people)
will give Costa Rica eligibility for
military training and ''specific articles
for use in military counterinsurgency
operations" (Report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate on S. 960, International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985, Report 99-34, April 19, 1985,
p. 39).
In spite of Monge's strong assurances that Costa Rica's pacifist
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principles remain intact, many fear the
"Central Americanization" of Costa
Rica is just a matter of time. "You can
only say 'No' to a generous friend so
many times,'' remarks one Costa
Rican official (The New York Times,
July 19, 1985).
There are three seasons in Costa
Rica: the rainy season, the dry season,
and the season of fighting with the
Nicaraguans, so goes a local saying.
Historical tensions with Nicaragua go
back to 1948 and 1949 when Somoza
sent soldiers to aid Calderon Guardia
against Figueres. In 1977, Somoza provoked a confrontation which nearly
killed a Costa Rican government
minister. Though the government officially opposes contra activities along
the border, many Costa Ricans are
sympathetic to Nicaraguans who oppose the Nicaraguan government-as
they were to rebels opposing Somoza in
the late 70's-and turn a blind eye to
Eden Pastora and Fernando Chamorro's use of national territory for a base
of operations.
As squirmishes occurred between
Nicaraguan soldiers and contra bands,
accusations between the two nations
flew and amicable relations grew increasingly more strained. Fueled by a
right-wing press, backed by the conservative business sector and the antiCommunist paramilitary Free Costa
Rica Movement, anti-Nicaragua sentiments hit a "hysteria" high last year
when in May two Costa Rican civil
guardsmen were killed in a border confrontation. An OAS investigation
determined that the shots came from
Nicaragua but could not prove if the
aggressors were contras or Sandinistas.
Costa Rica then refused to accept a
newly-appointed Nicaraguan ambassador and demanded an explanation
for the shooting. A mob of 500 Costa
Ricans stormed the Nicaraguan Embassy, tearing down its flag and
shouting anti-Sandinista slogans. The
press stepped up its rhetoric, attacking
not only Sandinistas but peace and
human rights groups, academics and
U.S. groups opposed to contra funding. Rafael Fournier
Calderon,
presidential candidate from the Social
Christian Unity Party came out publicly in favor of U.S. aid to the contras
and pledged to send Costa Rica's civil
guards to fight alongside Honduras in
the event of a conflict with Nicaragua.
A poll taken by an affiliate of Gallup
International after the border incident
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showed that the majority of Costa
Ricans disapproved of the Sandinista
regime and favored U.S. funding to the
contras.
During the earlier stages of presidential campaigns, Oscar Arias kept silent
on the issue of neutrality. Meanwhile,
on the second annivesary of his original presidential proclamation
of
neutrality in 1983, President Monge introduced a bill to the national assembly
that would reaffirm the nation's
"perpetual, active and unarmed"
neutrality. Then late in the campaign,
Arias came out strongly in favor of
neutrality-"effective neutrality as the
basis of our peace"; to fight for
negotiated and political solutions, not
military ones'' (Aportes, March/ April
1986, San Jose, Costa Rica, p. 6)-and
his party, the National Liberation Party (PLN) conducted a survey, indicating that the majority of Costa
Ricans, no matter how much they disliked the Sandinistas, did not favor going to war against them.
While debating contra aid two
months ago, the Reagan administration quoted the results of a survey commissioned by the United States Information Agency (USIA) that showed
that 69 percent of Costa Ricans support U.S. aid to the contras. The poll,
announced in the San Jose conservative La Nacion and quoted by
former U.S. ambassador to the U.N.,
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, by contra leader
Alfonso Robelo and by special negotiator for the Reagan administration,
Philip Habib, was taken last July when
emotions ran high over the killing of
the two Costa Rican guards. A second
part of that same survey, taken in November 1985 showed dramatically
lower figures. Victor Ramirez, a prominent pollster and political strategist
for President Oscar Arias said his polls
show less than 10 percent of Costa
Ricans support the U.S. position and
that the USIA sampling method had an
intended specific purpose: "The only
thing I can think of is that they are just
manipulating the American people, using these kinds of results in order to
favor Reagan policies about this
issue." (Tony Avirgan for National
Public Radio in San Jose, March 24,
1986).
In February, Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega officially acknowledged
that Sandinista soldiers killed the two
Costa Rican guardsmen in May 1985
and diplomatic relations between the
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two nations resumed. In a move to
''leave Mr. Arias a clean slate on which
to write his own policy toward the Sandinistas" (Christian Science Monitor,
February 27, 1986), Costa Rica and
Nicaragua signed a pact to set up an inspection and vigilance commission on
their mutual border. Contadora and
support group countries will supply
vehicles and materials for border
patrols and petition other countries for
financial assistance. Costa Rica and
Nicaragua will supply food and housing for commission members. Many
are skeptical, citing previous failures of
such commissions due to violent incidents on the border and lack of
material support. Leaders of both
countries, however, view the plan as a
sign of the political will of Central
Americans to solve their problems on
their own. "We are showing once
again that there is a desire for peace
among Central Americans,''
said
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
(CSM, February 27, 1986). "Although
the installations of the commission
may not please the United States, I am
very sorry," asserted President Monge,
"but this time, as on many other occasions, this deals with a sovereign decision of Costa Rica" (La Nacion,
March 11, 1986).
To a multitude of applause on the
eve of his victory, Oscar Arias promised to serve the humble, fully incorporate women, redirect the economy to
satisfy the most needy, distribute
political power, fight for greater
economic democracy, fight against
corruption and finally to def end and
revitalize Costa Rican peace. But as
many economic analysts see it, the
country doesn't offer many realistic
possibilities to increase production except through doubling of U.S. aid.
Though the drop in oil prices and the
rise in coffee prices will give President
Arias some breathing room, this will
not be enough to remedy an economy
that dedicates almost 35 percent of the
value of its exports to pay the interest
on the foreign debt, now reaching $4
billion. President Monge, negotiating
austerity measures with the IMF in
1983, was successful in weathering the
economic crisis of the early 80's but
President Arias will have to confront
structural economic problems that
threaten the very foundations of Costa
Rica's social democratic welfare state.
In his article outlining the Reagan
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Veterans for Peace, P.O. Box 3881,
Portland, ME 04104.
Veterans for Peace was organized
in 1985 by Maine vets who firmly
support Charles Clement's quote:
''Veterans-as
those who have fought
in wars or served in the military-are
our most potent resource for peace.''
The vets believe that there is a
desperate need to do outreach to
other veterans, because veterans who
have reached a stage in their recovery
or development that allows them to
find peace within themselves, discover
that the tradition veterans' organizations fail to address their concerns,
and this is especially true of combat
veterans. Likewise, many military
veterans have a great deal of difficulty acclimating themselves to the atmosphere within which the traditional
non-veteran peace-advocacy organizations exist because they perceive the
differences in personal perspectives as
overwhelming. In the past this
perception has discouraged many
veterans from being actively involved
in peace-advocacy work. Reversing
this misconception, and providing the
motivation and means for military
veterans to educate the general public
with respect to the unaccepted cost of
wars and weaponry, is their primary
goal. One of the organization's projects is the VFP Newsletter which is
viewed as the most practical and
economic means of maintaining com
munication and solidarity, and will
serve to further motivate "at-large"
members to establish state chapters,
participate in recruitment drives as
well as VFP educational and protest
activities, facilitate coordination of
activities and provide a medium for
the exchange of ideas and information. Resist's grant went towards
helping to defray the costs of the
newsletter.
Leonard Peltier Support House, P.O.
Box 6130, Kansas City, KS 66106.
The Leonard Peltier Support House
was organized and is maintained by a
small group of Leonard Peltier's supporters who came to live and work in
the Kansas City area in order to support Leonard as closely and effectively as possible. Leavenworth Prison,
where Leonard is now, is only about
40 miles from the group's location.
Two of the members are lawyers who
see Leonard often in order to consult
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with him on legal matters arising
from his case and incarceration, and
to give him the protection and support of frequent visitors. A suit
brought by one of the House's attorneys for the religious rights of
Leonard, Standing Deer, and Albert
Garza resulted in all three being
released from many months in
solitary confinement. Because of this
work, Indian prisoners in trouble
from all over the country call the
House for assistance. Those calls
stimulate calls -to prison officials, the
media in the prison areas, and to
local attorneys, when legal action is
needed. A major part of the group's
education work is a newsletter, Bayou
La Rose. They are also very active in
supporting the resistance to the eviction of 14,000 Navajos from their
homes in the Big Mountain area of
the Hopi-Navajo Reservation in
Northeastern Arizona. Resist's grant
went towards the cost of publishing
the newsletter.

Special Help Needed
For the past several years, Resist has
been sharing a computer with several
other progressive organizations and
publications. However, due to the increasing growth of our organization
and the scope of our work, we have
realized that at this point in time,
Resist needs its own computer. Since
we hadn't included funds for a new
computer in our budget for the year,
we are going to you, our supporters,
for some special assistance. If you
would like to make a contribution
towards a new computer, please fill out
the form below and send it in with your
check. Thanks so much.
Yes, I would like to give $__
towards a Resist Computer.

Name ___________
Address__________
Clty___

State__ Zip___

_

_
_
_

Costa Rica
Continued from Page Seven
administration's efforts to undermine
the pillars of Costa Rica's social peace,
Andrew Reding points out Washington's main objectives: "First, to
reshape Costa Rica in the image of
Ronald Reagan's United States by
slashing social spending in favor of
new military spending and by giving
carte blanche to domestic and foreign
private enterprise; and second, to obtain Costa Rican cooperation in more
firmly encircling Nicaragua with a
strengthened southern front" (Andrew
Reding, ''Costa Rica: Democratic
Model in Jeopardy,"
World Policy
Journal, Spring 1986, p. 302).
Recently, the five Central American
nations pledged to reach a comprehensive agreement to end hostilities. The
Caraballeda pledge emphasized that
''the solution of Latin American proble.ms should spring from and be ensured by the region itself so that the
area will not be put into the East-West
world strategic conflict." But as Javier
Solis, ex-priest and the newly-elected
senator to the legislative assembly from
the party Pueblo Unido, sadly points
out, ''The pressures and blackmail of
all kinds in the middle of a tremendous
production crisis has put the government of Costa Rica in a weak position.
It can't negotiate because it would lose
the financial injection that the Northamerican administration's
support
represents. It is a government practically mortgaged to U.S.AID. The
neutrality
proclamation
has been
neutralized. It has been emptied of its
contents"
(Pensamiento Propio,
January-February 1986, p. 17).
As the Costa Rican people so clearly
understood before going to the polls in
February, their small, peaceful nation
stands to lose a rich tradition of
political and social democracy if they
are forced to endorse a military solution engineered in Washington. "It is
our deep desire that when these fratricidal wars end," stated President
Monge in a letter to the U.S. House of
Representatives last year, ''Costa Rica
will be able to help heal the wounds of
our neighbors. Our policy of permanent, active and unarmed neutrality is
very important if we are to have an opportunity to fulfill this goal."

Maureen Dunn is a staffperson at the
Washington Office on Latin America.
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